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Leibniz, the Young Kant, and Boscovich on the Relationality of Space 
Idan Shimony (Tel Aviv) 
Leibniz’s main thesis regarding the nature of space is that space is relational.1 
This means that space is not an independent object or existent in itself, but 
rather a set of relations between objects existing at the same time. The reality 
of space, therefore, is derived from objects and their relations. For Leibniz and 
his successors, this view of space was intimately connected with the under-
standing of the composite nature of material objects. The nature of the relation 
between space and matter was crucial to the conceptualization of both space 
and matter. 
In this paper, I discuss Leibniz’s account of relational space and exam-
ine its novel elaborations by two of his successors, namely, the young Imman-
uel Kant and the Croat natural philosopher Roger Boscovich. Kant’s and 
Boscovich’s studies of Leibniz’s account lead them to original versions of the 
relational view of space. Thus, Leibniz’s relational space proved to be a phil-
osophically fruitful notion, as it yielded bold and intriguing attempts to deci-
pher the nature of space and was a key part in innovative scientific ideas. 
1. Leibniz’s Account of Relational Space
Leibniz’s main thesis regarding space is that it is relational. He defines space 
as a set of relations between things which exist at the same time. The following 
is a clear exposition of Leibniz’s definition of space from his correspondence 
with Samuel Clarke: 
“As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold space to be 
something merely relative, as time is; that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as 
1 In addition to the standard abbreviations for Gerhardt’s (GP, GM) and the Academy’s (A) 
editions of Leibniz’s texts, I use the following abbreviations: AG = G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical 
Essays, transl. by Roger Ariew/Daniel Garber, Indianapolis 1989; H = Id.: Theodicy, transl. by 
E. M. Huggard/ed. by Austin Farrer, London 1951; L = Id.: Philosophical Papers and Letters,
transl. by Leroy E. Loemker, Dordrecht 21969; LA = Id./Antoine Arnauld: The Leibniz-Arnauld 
Correspondence, transl. by Haydn T. Mason, Manchester 1967; LC = Id./Samuel Clarke: The
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. by Henry G. Alexander, Manchester 1956; PP = G. W.
Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, ed. by George H. R. Parkinson, London 1973; W = Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason. Background Source Materials, transl. and ed. by Eric Watkins, Cam-
bridge 2009.
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time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an 
order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing together, 
without enquiring into their manner of existing. And when many things are seen 
together, one perceives that order of things among themselves.”2 
 
Later in the correspondence, Leibniz provides an elucidation of his definition 
by means of an analogy with “genealogical space” or family connections: 
 
“[...] [space] can only be an ideal thing, containing a certain order, wherein the 
mind conceives the application of relations. In like manner, as the mind can 
fancy to itself an order made up of genealogical lines, whose bigness would 
consist only in the number of generations, wherein every person would have his 
place; and if to this one should add the fiction of a metempsychosis, and bring 
in the same human souls again, the persons in those lines might change place: 
he who was a father, or a grandfather, might become a son, or a grandson, etc. 
And yet those genealogical places, lines, and spaces, though they should 
express real truth, would only be ideal things.”3  
 
A family tree and its genealogical lines depend on the existence of certain 
persons and their connections. These persons, as family members, bear spe-
cific genealogical relations to one another and form a certain order among 
themselves. There is no “genealogical realm” over and above the family mem-
bers and the relations they bear to one another, and one need not assume such 
a realm in which these ordered relations somehow inhere, for these relations 
hold independently of any such presumed realm. The place of a family mem-
ber in the genealogical tree is determined by the relations she bears to other 
                                                 
2 “Leibniz’s 3rd letter”, § 4, LC, pp. 25–26. See also: “[…][space] is that order, which renders 
bodies capable of being situated, and by which they have a situation among themselves when 
they exist together” (“Leibniz’s 4th letter”, § 41, LC, p. 41); “[…] space is nothing but the order 
of existence of things possible at the same time” (“Letter to de Volder, 30 June 1704”; GP II, 
269 / L, p. 536); “[…] space is the order of coexisting phenomena” (“Letter to Des Bosses, 16 
June 1712”; GP II, 450 / L, p. 604); “[…] just as in time we conceive nothing but the very order 
[dispositio] or series of changes that can take place in time, so too, we understand nothing in 
space but the possible order of bodies” (“On Body and Force, against the Cartesians”; GP IV, 
394 / AG, p. 251); “[space] is a relationship: an order, not only among existents, but also among 
possibles as though they existed” (A VI, 6, 149; G. W. Leibniz: New Essays on Human Under-
standing, transl. by Peter Remnant/ Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge 1996, p. 149); “Space is the 
order of coexisting things, or the order of existence for things which are simultaneous” (“Met-
aphysical Foundations of Mathematics”; GM VII, 18 / L, p. 666); “[…] space is no more real 
than time, that is, […] space is nothing but the order of coexistents, just as time is the order of 
things that have existed before” (“Remarks on George Berkeley’s Principles of Human 
Knowledge”, AG, p. 307). 
3 “Leibniz’s 5th Letter”, § 47, LC, pp. 70–71. 
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family members, and not by her supposed absolute place in an independent 
genealogical sphere. 
In like manner, space is nothing but a set of relations between coexistent 
things, and there is no independent spatial entity over and above these things 
and their relations. Again, the place of a thing is determined by its spatial re-
lations to other things, namely how it is situated in relation to them and its 
distance from them, and not by some absolute position in an independent 
space. The place of a car driving northbound along a two kilometers one-way 
street can be determined by its relation to the street and the buildings along it. 
First, it is on the southern side of the street, near the buildings at the beginning 
of the street. After a couple of minutes, it is on the northern side of the street, 
near the buildings at the end of the street and two kilometers from the begin-
ning of the street. A second car, starting now the same route, is at the same 
place where the first was a couple of minutes ago. To say that it is “at the same 
place” is not to say that it fills the same part of an absolute space earlier filled 
by the first car, but simply that it bears the same relation to the street and the 
surrounding buildings as the first car did a couple of minutes ago.4 
On Leibniz’s account, then, space has no independent but merely deriv-
ative reality. It is not a self-subsistent “container” which makes the existence 
of objects possible. Rather, objects are logically prior to space: its reality is 
derived from and dependent on objects. Accordingly, one cannot literally 
mean that “things are in space”: things cannot actually be in space, because 
space is nothing over and above coexistent objects. Instead, this phrase has to 
be understood as indicating that things bear spatial relations to one another as 
explained above.5 
The reality of space is further downgraded in Leibniz’s account by his 
additional two theses, that is, the theses of ideality and phenomenality of 
space. The ideality thesis follows from the definition of space as relational and 
from Leibniz’s account of relations. Leibniz maintains that relations are essen-
tially ideal, since reality ultimately consists of substances and their accidents 
and relations can be neither one of these modes of reality.6 Consequently, 
4 See Leibniz’s definition of place in his “5th Letter to Clarke”, § 47, LC, pp. 69–70, and his 
consequent definition of space: “[…] that which comprehends all those places, is called space”; 
“[…] space results from places taken together.”  
5 For a lucid exposition and criticism of Leibniz’s arguments for his relational definition of 
space in the correspondence with Clarke, see Nick Huggett (ed.): Space from Zeno to Einstein. 
Classic Readings with a Contemporary Commentary, Cambridge 1999, pp. 160–168.  
6 A relation between two things is not itself a thing or a substance. Furthermore, it cannot be a 
property of a thing or an accident, “for if so, we should have an accident in two subjects, with 
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space, being nothing but a set of relations, is not a real but an ideal thing or a 
mental construct. The thesis that space is phenomenal is an independent one 
and does not follow from the former two theses regarding space. According 
to this thesis, space belongs to the phenomenal realm of physical things, and 
not to the fundamentally real sphere of substances or monads. That is, space 
consists in relations between physical things, and not between ultimately real 
substances. This does not, however, turn space into a fiction. Spatial relations 
still express truths, since they denote actual relationships between physical 
objects, which, although not ultimately real, are still grounded in true realities 
and, therefore, considered “well founded phenomena”7.  
This account introduces a metaphysics of three levels of reality: at the 
ground level are the genuinely real constituents of all reality, namely, sub-
stances; the second level consists of physical objects, which are aggregates or 
resultants of substances and, therefore, qualify as well founded phenomena;8 
at the third level stand space and time, which consist in relations between 
physical objects and, therefore, may qualify as well founded phenomena of 
second order.9 
In a letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz explains the reason that led him to his 
unique metaphysics and view of space: 
“I consider the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perceptions of 
monads functioning in harmony with each other, with corporeal substances re-
jected, to be useful for a fundamental investigation of things. In this way of 
explaining things, space is the order of coexisting phenomena, as time is the 
order of successive phenomena, and there is no spatial or absolute nearness or 
one leg in one, and the other in the other; which is contrary to the notion of accidents.” And 
“being neither a substance, nor an accident, it must be a mere ideal thing”, “Leibniz’s 5th 
Letter”, § 47, LC, p. 71. 
7 For a discussion of Leibniz’s three main theses regarding space, see Nicholas Jolley: Leibniz, 
London 2005, pp. 84–89. 
8 This idea appears at a multitude of places. See for example “Letter to Arnauld, 9 October 
1687”; A II, 2, 249 / LA, p. 152. “First Truths”; A VI, 4, 1648 / L, p. 270. “Letter to de Volder, 
30 June 1704”; GP II, 268–270 / L, p. 536–537. “Letter to de Volder, 1704–1705”; GP II, 275–
276 / AG, pp. 181–182. “Letter to Des Bosses, 15 March 1715”; GP II 492 / L, p. 609. “Letter 
to Nicolas Remond, 10 January 1714”; GP III, 606 / L, p. 655. “Letter to Nicolas Remond, 11 
February 1715”; GP III, 636 / L, p. 659. “Remarks on George Berkeley’s Principles of Human 
Knowledge”, AG, p. 307. “Against Barbaric Physics”; GP VII, 344 / AG, p. 319.  
9 On the three ontological levels in Leibniz’s metaphysics, see Jill Vance Buroker: Space and 
Incongruence. The Origin of Kant’s Idealism, Dordrecht 1981, pp. 35–37. It is sometimes ar-
gued that the ascription of well founded phenomena to space and time is less appropriate, since 
they are merely mental constructs, and that Leibniz accordingly in later texts prefers to classify 
them as ideal rather than well founded phenomena. On this point, see Robert Merrihew Adams: 
Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist, New York 1994, pp. 253–255.  
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distance between monads… In this conception, also, there is involved no ex-
tension or composition of the continuum, and all difficulties about points dis-
appear. It is this that I tried to say somewhere in my Theodicy – that the diffi-
culties in the composition of a continuum ought to warn us that we must think 
far differently of things.”10 
Leibniz suggests here that it is the consideration of the difficulties in the com-
position of continuous entities that led him to “think far differently of things” 
and to advance his original metaphysics and account of space. In the Theodicy, 
he claims that this puzzle constitutes one of the “two famous labyrinths where 
our reason very often goes astray” and that it arises due to “lack of a true 
conception of the nature of substance and matter.”11 Now the problem of the 
composition of continuous things and the nature of substance and matter es-
sentially involves two central issues: the composite nature of physical objects 
and the relation between objects and space. 
On the one hand, Leibniz argues that composite objects (“beings by ag-
gregation”) draw their reality from their parts. If they were composed of parts 
which are also composite and so on to infinity, they would lack a foundation 
for their reality and would not be genuinely real. Therefore, to be real, they 
must ultimately be composed of true entities or substances, the hallmark of 
which is unity. 
“[…] every being by aggregation presupposes beings endowed with real unity, 
because every being derives its reality only from the reality of those beings of 
which it is composed, so that it will not have any reality at all if each being of 
which it is composed is itself a being by aggregation, a being for which we must 
still seek further grounds for its reality, grounds which can never be found in 
this way, if we must always continue to seek for them.”12
10 “Letter to des Bosses”, 16 June 1712; GP II, 450–451 / L, p. 604. 
11 See: “There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray: one concerns 
the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in the production and the origin of 
Evil; the other consists in the discussion of continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to 
be the elements thereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in. The first 
perplexes almost all the human race, the other exercises philosophers only. I shall have per-
chance at another time an opportunity to declare myself on the second, and to point out that, for 
lack of a true conception of the nature of substance and matter, people have taken up false 
positions leading to insurmountable difficulties, difficulties which should properly be applied 
to the overthrow of these very positions” (“Theodicy”, preface; GP VI, 29 / H, p. 53–54). Cf. 
“Theodicy – Preliminary Dissertation”, § 24; GP VI, 64–65 / H, p. 88–89; “On Freedom”; A VI, 
4, 1654 / L, p. 264. 
12 “Letter to Arnauld, 30 April 1687”; A II, 2 184 / AG, p. 85. Cf.: “The monad […] is nothing 
but a simple substance which enters into compounds […] There must be simple substances, 
since there are compounds, for the compounded is but a collection or an aggregate of simples 
[…] The monads are the true atoms of nature; in a word, they are elements of things. We need 
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Although this line of argument became a strong rationalistic tenet,13 it may 
also draw its ground from the nature of mechanical explanation. To explain a 
physical object mechanically is to derive its properties from the properties of 
its parts. The properties of the parts depend, in turn, on the properties of the 
parts of the parts, and so on. Now if this mode of explanation is to work, it 
seems that a certain ground floor of fundamental parts with primitive proper-
ties has to be postulated.14 
On the other hand, the spatial extension of objects may seem to imply 
that their division into parts proceeds indefinitely. Space, as a continuous mag-
nitude, is infinitely divisible. A spatial region, however small, can always be 
further divided; its division never ends in indivisible, simple parts of which it is 
composed. And if this essential characteristic of space is somehow carried over 
to objects, then they too cannot be composed of simple parts. This is clearly the 
case in Descartes’s account. Descartes identifies space with matter and main-
tains that the nature of body consists in extension.15 Therefore, on his account, 
objects, just like space, are not made up of simple parts.16 In addition, abso-
lutist views of space may also be taken as implying the same conclusion. On 
                                                 
fear no dissolution in them, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can 
be destroyed naturally” (“Monadology” §§ 1–4; GP VI, 607 / L, p. 643). See also “New Sys-
tem”, § 3; GP IV, 478–479 / L, p. 454. “New System”, § 11; GP IV, 482 / L, p. 456. “Principles 
of Nature and Grace”, § 1; GP VI, 598 / L, p. 636. For a discussion of the unity and simplicity 
of substances, see Jolley: Leibniz, pp. 37–41.  
13 Christian Wolff argues that simples are the ground of composites: “If there are composite 
things, there must also be simple beings. For if no simple beings were present, then all parts – they 
can be taken to be as small as you might ever like, even inconceivably small parts – would have 
to consist of other parts. But then, since one could provide no reason where the composite parts 
would ultimately come from, just as little as one could comprehend where a composite number 
would arise from if it contained no unities in itself, and yet nothing can be without a sufficient 
ground […], one must ultimately admit simple things from which the composites arise” (Christian 
Wolff: “Rational Thoughts on God, the World and the Soul of Human Beings, Also All Things in 
General”, § 76, in: W, p. 17). Alexander Baumgarten also reasons that if there are composites, 
there must be simples: “A composite cannot exist, except as the determinations of others […] 
Now, apart from composites, there are only simples […] Therefore, if composites exist, monads 
exist” (Alexander Baumgarten: “Metaphysics” § 245, in: W, p. 103).  
14 This line of thought seems to be implied in Isaac Newton: Opticks, New York 1979, pp. 400–
404. 
15 See: “[…] the same extension which constitutes the nature of body also constitutes the nature 
of space” (René Descartes: Principles of Philosophy II, § 11, transl. by Valentin R. Miller and 
Reese P. Miller, Dordrecht 1983, p. 43). 
16 See: “We also easily understand that it is not possible for any atoms, or parts of matter which 
are by their own nature indivisible, to exist. The reason is that if there were such things, they 
would necessarily have to be extended, no matter how tiny they are imagined to be. We can, 
therefore, still conceive of each of them being divided into two or more smaller ones, and thus 
 
Leibniz, the Young Kant, and Boscovich on the Relationality of Space 79 
these views, space, as a receptacle in which bodies extend, is a condition for 
the existence and structure of bodies. Therefore, bodies are essentially ex-
tended entities. Put differently, spatial extension is a primary quality of bodies 
and this implies their infinite divisibility.17 
Now Leibniz accepts both seemingly conflicting views. He both agrees 
that physical objects are, in some sense, infinitely divisible and insists that 
simple substances essentially constitute composite objects. His way out of this 
labyrinth rests on his original conception of space and his threefold ontology: 
by downgrading the ontological status of space, Leibniz is able to discard the 
idea that extension in space is a primary property of objects,18 and to propose 
an entirely different understanding of the constitution of objects. Thus, on the 
phenomenal level, physical objects are indeed infinitely divisible extended 
masses in space. But on a deeper metaphysical level, they are ultimately con-
stituted by “metaphysical points” or simple substances. Construed in a way 
analogous to spirits, these metaphysical points are active simple entities, and 
their counterparts in the physical realm are corporeal substances essentially 
made up of physical forces.19
we know that they are divisible. For it is impossible to [clearly and distinctly] conceive of di-
viding anything without knowing, from that very fact, that it is divisible” (ibid., § 20, pp. 48–
49).
17 It is important of course to distinguish between different meanings of divisibility in this con-
text: see the distinction between formal and actual divisibility in note 21 below.  
18 See “Discourse on Metaphysics”, § 12; A II, 4, 1545 / L, 309–310. “Letter to Arnauld, 30 
April 1687”; A II, 2, 187–188 / AG, pp. 86–87. “Letter to Arnauld, 9 October 1687”; A II, 2, 
249–250 / LA, pp. 152–153. “A Specimen of Discoveries”; A VI, 4, 1622 / PP, pp. 81. “On 
Body and Force, against the Cartesians”; GP IV, 393–394 / AG, pp. 251. “Specimen Dynami-
cum”; GM, VI, 246–247 / L, pp. 444–445. “Letter to De Volder, 24 March 1699”; GP II, 169–
170 / L, pp. 516. “Letter to De Volder, 23 June 1699”; GP II, pp. 182–183 / L, p. 519. On 
Leibniz on the idea of extension, see Charlie D. Broad: Leibniz. An Introduction, London 1975, 
pp. 54–55; Glenn A. Hartz: Leibniz’s Final System. Monads, Matter and Animals, London 
2007, pp. 63–65.  
19 In “New System” (§ 3, GP IV, 478–479 / L, p. 454; § 11, GP IV, 482 / L, p. 456) Leibniz 
concludes by elimination that the basic elements constituting composites must be metaphysical 
points. These elements can be neither material atoms, since they are “contrary to reason,” nor 
mathematical points, since they are limits rather than parts of extended objects. Hence, the basic 
elements must be metaphysical points. For an analysis of Leibniz’s discussions of divisibility 
and simple parts of matter, see Hartz: Leibniz’s Final System, ch. 2 and 3. Hartz shows that 
Leibniz is concerned with two aspects of division of matter. From one point of view, matter is 
regarded as infinitely divisible into ever smaller mass-parts. From another, matter is actually 
divided into simple substances. This distinction, Hartz suggests, enables Leibniz to finally find 
his way out of the “labyrinth of the continuum” (Hartz: Leibniz’s Final System, p. 72). 
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2. Kant’s Version of Relational and Real Space
In his 1756 Physical Monadology, Kant uses a Leibnizian conception of rela-
tional space, together with a dynamical model of matter, to resolve the con-
troversy regarding the theory of monads and the constitution of matter be-
tween Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysicians and Newtonian thinkers in the 
1740s and 1750s Berlin Academy.20 As Leonard Euler observed, the key point 
in the controversy was the conception of spatial extension.21 He succinctly 
summarized the Leibnizian line of thought as follows. Since it is “a completely 
established truth that extension is divisible to infinity, and that it is impossible 
to conceive parts so small as to be unsusceptible of further division,” philoso-
phers who reject the infinite divisibility of bodies “do not impugn this truth 
itself, but deny that it takes place in existing bodies” by downgrading exten-
sion to the status of a merely abstract, ideal property.22 
20 The newly reestablished Berlin Academy was torn between Newtonians and Wolffians. The 
former were led by the president of the Academy, Pierre Louis Maupertuis, and the Academy’s 
preeminent mathematician and scientist, Leonard Euler. Despite the fact that Wolff declined 
King Frederick the Great’s invitation to co-lead the Berlin Academy, Wolffians were still dom-
inant and serving at key positions in the Academy (e.g. Samuel Formey, the secretary of the 
Academy). The Academy made monadology the subject for the prize contest of 1747. Scholars 
were asked to clearly formulate the doctrine of monads and then to decide whether it could be 
decisively proved or refuted. Anti-monadists objected that monads violated the established law 
of inertia. To posit that material elements are endowed with spontaneous activity and inner 
powers capable of altering the states of the bodies which they constitute is at odds with the 
essential passivity of objects professed by this law. On their view, observed changes in the 
actual world must be exclusively accounted for by means of external forces. They also argued 
that the simplicity of monads conflicts with the infinite divisibility of the space occupied by 
material bodies. It appeared inexplicable to them that infinitely divisible bodies could be con-
stituted by simple substances or elements. An anti-monadist essay won the contest, but the de-
bate was not settled thereby. For detailed historical accounts of the conflict, see Lewis White 
Beck: Early German Philosophy. Kant and His Predecessors, Cambridge 1969, pp. 314–319; 
Ronald Calinger: “The Newtonian-Wolffian Controversy. 1740–1759,” in: Journal of the His-
tory of Ideas 30 (1969), pp. 319–330; Irving Polonoff: Force, Cosmos, Monads and other 
Themes of Kant’s Early Thought, Bonn 1973, pp. 77–89; Alison Laywine: Kant’s Early Meta-
physics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy, Atascadero 1993, pp. 27–31.  
21 See Leonard Euler: “Letters to a German Princess”, in: W, p. 213: “The controversy between 
modern philosophers and geometers […] turns on the divisibility of body. This property is un-
doubtedly founded on extension, and it is only in so far as bodies are extended that they are 
divisible and capable of being reduced to parts”.
22 Ibid., The debate spread beyond the walls of the Academy and attracted the attention of non-
professional intellectuals and laymen as well. Euler, one of the central figures in the debate, 
vividly depicts the agitation it aroused in the German world: “There was a time when the dispute 
about monads employed such general attention and was conducted with so much warmth that 
it forced its way into the company of every description, that of the guardroom not excepted. 
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Although Kant advocated a relational conception of space, he did not 
submit to this line of thought. Kant sought for a theory that would 
acknowledge both the infinite divisibility of space and the claim that physical 
objects consist of simple substances, but without downgrading space to merely 
ideal thing and without construing substances as mental. He thus proposed a 
theory of relational but real space and of monads or simple substances which 
are essentially physical. This theory of physical monads has the advantage that 
it avoids the problem of explaining how the physical and spatial properties of 
material objects arise from non-extended, mental Leibnizian monads, of 
which bodies are supposed to be composed. 
The question is how it is possible for simple physical substances to be 
in space or to fill a space without thereby loosing their simplicity, given that 
space is infinitely divisible. The answer turns on Kant’s insight that filling a 
space does not necessarily entail being composed of independent parts. Some-
thing filling a space must be composite only on the additional assumption that 
the formal divisibility of space entails the actual divisibility of things in space 
and hence their non-simplicity.23 To avoid this additional assumption and the 
conclusion that it implies, Kant advances a relational view of space and a dy-
namical model of matter. These two doctrines allow him to maintain both that 
bodies extend in space and that they consist of simple parts.  
Regarding space, Kant claims that “since space is not a substance but a 
certain appearance of the external relation of substances, it follows that the 
possibility of dividing the relation of one and the same substance into two 
parts is not incompatible with the simplicity [or] unity of the substance”24 In 
There was scarcely a lady at court who did not take a decided part in favor of monads or against 
them. In a word, all conversation was engrossed by monads – no other subject could find ad-
mission” (Euler: “Letters”, in: W, p. 218). 
23 By “actual” divisibility I understand the logical possibility to separate and distance parts from 
one another. It is clear that space is not divisible in this meaning: it is logically impossible to 
distance one region of space from the regions adjacent to it. In the case of space, it is possible 
merely to identify parts or regions and mark borders between them, which means that space is 
only “formally” divisible. And see the quotation from Kant in the following footnote. 
24 “Physical Monadology” = PM, 1, 480. Writings by Kant are cited by section number (if 
applicable) and volume and page number of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by the German 
Academy of Sciences, Berlin 1900–. Translations to English are from the Cambridge Edition 
of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge 1992–. See 
also: “The division of space […] is not the separation of things, of which one is set apart from 
another and has a self-sufficient existence of its own. It rather displays a certain plurality or 
quantity in an external relation. Since this is the case, it is obvious that a plurality of substantial 
parts does not follow from the division of space. Since it is this plurality alone which would be 
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other words, space depends on external relations between physical substances. 
It is not a substance or an independent entity which is logically prior to phys-
ical substances. Hence, it is not a condition for their existence and, therefore, 
they need not assume its structure and admit infinite divisibility. 
Put differently, spatial properties are not primitive properties of physi-
cal objects. They are not something which objects possess simply because they 
exist. For example, a thing existing on its own without any actual connections 
to other things has no spatial place. To have a place, it must be a part of a 
world, namely, a system of things which bear actual relations and interactions 
among one another.25 Having a spatial position thus presupposes external re-
lations. And these, in turn, are derived from the reciprocal actions which bod-
ies exercise upon one another by means of their forces.  
Similarly, the spatial extension of physical objects depends on the 
forces which constitute the very essence of matter. On Kant’s dynamical 
model of matter, material objects are composed of physical monads, which 
are point-like elements exerting repulsive and attractive forces. Repulsion is 
stronger near the point-like element, while attraction is stronger at greater dis-
tances. The set of equilibrium points between repulsion and attraction (i.e. the 
points where the monad neither repels nor attracts other monads) defines the 
limit of the spatial extension of a physical monad. It is clear, then, that though 
it is possible to discern different spatial parts in the sphere of extension of the 
monad, it is not possible to separate or distance these parts from one another, 
since they all depend on and radiate from the same point-like source of forces. 
Hence, although it extends in space and fills a space, the monad is nonetheless 
simple.26 
To sum up, Kant’s version of relational space and his model of matter 
provide an alternative way out of the labyrinth of the continuum. Note that for 
Kant, space is not derived, as for Leibniz, from mere apparent external rela-
tions between phenomenal objects constituted by “windowless” monads, but 
rather from genuine reciprocal actions of material elements upon one another 
in virtue of their physical forces. Therefore, for Kant space is relational and 
opposed to the substantial simplicity of the monad, it is sufficiently clear that the divisibility of 
space is not at all opposed to the simplicity of the monad” (PM, 1, 480). 
25 This definition of a world recurs throughout Kant’s pre-critical texts. See for example “Living 
Forces”, § 8, 1, 22–23; “New Elucidation”, 1, 414; “Inaugural Dissertation”, § 2, 2, 390. 
26 For a detailed account of Kant’s dynamical model of matter in the “Physical Monadology”, see 
Idan Shimony: The Antinomies and Kant’s Conception of Nature, Tel Aviv 2013, pp. 35–43. 
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real.27 And this is enough to resolve the problem of the composition of phys-
ical objects. 
3. Boscovich on Derivative and Discrete Space
Roger Boscovich also put forward an account which regards space as deriva-
tive. But he approached the subject from a different angle. His main task in 
his 1758 Theory of Natural Philosophy was to settle the problem regarding 
collisions between bodies. This led him to a dynamical theory of material el-
ements similar to that of Kant.28 Boscovich was reluctant to enter the puzzle 
concerning the nature of space and time, since he thought “that this is merely a 
question of terminology.”29 Nevertheless, he made some contentious claims on 
this issue and presented an intriguing view of derivative space.  
On Boscovich’s account, local and temporal properties are real modes 
of existence of material elements: “Any point [of matter] has a real mode of 
existence, through which it is where it is; and another, due to which it exists 
at the time when it does exist. These real modes of existence are to me real 
time and space.”30 Since real time and space are nothing but these modes of 
27 As Lewis White Beck noted, for Kant “Space must be ontologically real, but it need not be 
ontologically primitive”; Beck: Philosophy, p. 447). 
28 Boscovich accepted Leibniz’s criticism of the view that matter is composed of perfectly hard 
and undeformable elements (for Leibniz’s criticism, see Idan Shimony: “What is (the) Matter 
– Locke, Leibniz, and the Controversy that Could not Take Place,” in: Herbert Breger/Jürgen
Herbst/Sven Erdner (eds.): Natur und Subjekt. IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover
2011, pp. 1070–1079, here p. 1078). If that were the case, then while bouncing in collision,
elements would change their motion in an instant. This is a violation of the principle of conti-
nuity, which Boscovich regarded as a primary principle of nature. Furthermore, such a change
involves infinite acceleration and therefore, in accord with Newton’s force law, infinite force.
Hence, Boscovich proposed a dynamical view of matter which admitted the elasticity required
for observing the principle of continuity. He elaborated a system of point particles exerting
forces on each other and making up material bodies. The main difference between the systems
of Kant and Boscovich is that Boscovich postulated one unified force with changing influence
instead of an interplay of two distinct forces. According to Boscovich’s force law, the force
projected by a point particle repels at very short distances and increases infinitely as the distance
diminishes infinitely. At somewhat farther (but still rather short) distances, the force varies be-
tween repulsion and attraction in a wave-like manner. At greater distances, the force attracts
and weakens with the distance in accordance with Newton’s inverse square law of attraction
(Roger J. Boscovich: Theory of Natural Philosophy, transl. by James Mark Child, Cambridge
1966, §§ 7–15.).
29 Ibid., § 142.
30 Ibid., § 197.
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existence of material elements, and since, further, matter in Boscovich’s the-
ory is composed of indivisible points and does not continuously extend, real 
time and space are also discrete rather than continuous.  
The continuity we ascribe to space is merely ideal. When we abstract 
from the actual points of matter and conceive the possibility of interposing as 
many points as we like between any two given points, we form for ourselves 
the idea of an imaginary continuous space.31 Thus Boscovich concludes: “I 
recognize no coexisting continuum… for, in my opinion, space is not any real 
continuum, but only an imaginary one.”32  
One decisive feature of Boscovich’s theory is the priority of matter over 
space. Discrete points of matter are the fundamental elements of his account. 
Everything else depends on them and the force law governing their activity. 
Thus, even though Boscovich wishes to stay away from the dispute regarding 
the nature of space, his theory implies a version of a derivative view of space, 
one that, moreover, entails the discrete nature of real space from the non-con-
tinuous character of material points. 
4. Conclusion
I discussed in this paper Leibniz’s account of relational space and its elabora-
tions by Kant and Boscovich. All three thinkers regarded matter as logically 
prior to space and advanced relational and derivative views of space. Leibniz 
argued for relational and ideal space in order to resolve the problem of the 
constitution of matter. Kant had the same motivation for suggesting a rela-
tional account of space. Yet he suggested that to resolve this problem it is 
sufficient to postulate a relational and real space and monads which are phys-
ical rather than mental. For Boscovich, the view that real space is derivative 
and discrete was the outcome of a theory of matter designed to preserve Leib-
niz’s principle of continuity. Thus, Leibniz’s notion of relational space proved 
to be a fruitful philosophical idea. It yielded bold and intriguing attempts to 
decipher the nature of space. For all three thinkers, the relational account of 
space was combined with a dynamical view of matter. Thus it was integrated in 
theories of nature that introduced novel scientific ideas: Leibniz’s theory of na-
ture suggested, for example, a rudimentary formulation of the principle of con-
servation of energy, while the Kant-Boscovich model of matter is of historical 
31 See ibid., § 198. 
32 Ibid., § 142. 
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importance as the forerunner of 19th century field theories and certain dynam-




                                                 
33 For an analysis of Leibniz’s discussion of conservation principles, see: Idan Shimony: “Leib-
niz and the Vis Viva Controversy,” in Marcelo Dascal (ed.): The Practice of Reason. Leibniz 
and His Controversies, Philadelphia 2010, pp. 51–73. For a systematic survey of the Kant-
Boscovich model of matter, see Thomas Holden: The Architecture of Matter. Galileo to Kant, 
Oxford 2004, pp. 236–272. See also Max Jammer: Concepts of Force. A Study in the Founda-
tions of Dynamics, New York 1962, pp. 158–187; Thomas Hankins: “Eighteenth-Century At-
tempts to Resolve the Vis viva Controversy,” in: Isis 56 (1965), pp. 281–297, here pp. 291–
297; Jeffrey Edwards: Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge. On Kant’s Philos-
ophy of Material Nature, Berkeley 2000, pp. 103–105.  
